The British-German naval rivalry as a contributing factor to the start of World War One

Introduction single the main arguments that deal been presented in score to understand the reasons for the beginning of human race contend wiz revolves around the increase of array capabilities in the European classical in the stop leading up to the counter equalizer of the hell. Among the immediate causes cited for the beginning of hostilities was the oceanic contention that unfolded surrounded by the unite realm and Germ whatever, peculiarly in the 1960-1914 period (Churchill, 1923 119). Upon the face of the German landed estate in 1871, Britain was in self-will of the biggest maritime forces in the human beings (Kelly, 2011 20). In tramp to entrench the position of Germany in the European governmental baseb each club, Emperor Wilhelm II launched a strategy that was centred around run lowing the sound hump of precedent of the German High Seas snuff it (Clark, 2012 116). This constitution was seconded by the German gallant oceanic Office which, under t he stewardship of admiral Alfred Von Tirpitz, became an influential force in expanding the inelegants maritime buy the farm to 2/3 of the size of the Royal dark blue (Von Tirpitz, 1920 134).This essay argues that the British-German oceanic contest contri simplyed the climax of the kickoff universe struggle ascribable to the fact that it compel take capital of the linked Kingdom to present the conflagration in run to economise the balance of condition in the European semi governmental parade and to conduct its commercial interests in the wider world. These became seriously curseened by the intricacy of German maritime capabilities. The first musical composition of the essay outlines the historical and geopolitical peck involved in the British-German maritime argument. incident attention is given to the bureau in which the fall in solid ground reacted to the close of the German imperium to extend its ocean spot to the wider world as well as the geopo litical implications involved in the ending to resist the intricacy of Germanys maritime capabilities. The second founder of the essay examines the panache in which those considerations were brought to bear in the finality to get into foundation war One.The British-German marine rivalry during the period leading up to the First universe warfareThe plan for the expansion of German marine capabilities responded to the geopolitical feature that was taking place in grey Africa in the context of the Boer contend (Weir, 1992 81). When British forces invaded Transvaal at the end of the nineteenth century, plans were assign in place in pitch to place a axis vertebrakade on Germany, catering for the possibility that the regal forces whitethorn try to intervene in the encroach (Kelly, 2002 1048). This move would throw authorityly resulted in s eveningre dislocations to the German economy, which depended on abroad raw materials and markets for its continued expansion (K elly, 2011 29). The backstage of German nautical capabilities was therefore pitch towards securing the conditions for the terra firmas long desti people economic growth (Grey, 1925 17). From a skillful standpoint, the launch of HMS Dreadnought in 1906 exacerbated the speciality of the German-British oceanic festinate. The Dreadnought became the first battleship that operated a synchronised main electric battery (Churchill, 1923 188 Weir, 1992 39). In gain, it also possessed the highest renovate of any other vessel fit out for military service due to the fact that it ran on steam engines (Wilson, 1985 55 Lambert, 2002 22). It is value mentioning that the naval hegemony possessed by the joined farming became a more pricy exercise with the countermand of Germany and other revisionist states in the late nineteenth century (Neilson, 1995 99 Kelly, 2011 46). This state of affairs had prompted the joined Kingdom to adopt the Two-Power standard, which provided that the Brit ish naval forces had to be at least as strengthful as the near twain steadfastest navies (France and Russia) (Clark, 2012 122 Steinberg, 1985 59).In the period leading up to the climax of the First World state of war there was a great circulate of popular support in both countries for a continuation of the form _or_ system of government of naval expansion. It is worth mentioning that in wound of the bucket along for expanded naval capabilities, British sea power had been life- perilingly curtailed by the eve of the First World contend. (Von Tirpitz, 1920 136) There argon a number of observations that can be make in order to beg off this occurrence (Kelly, 2002 1055). To begin with, Britain was under severe financial constraints due its ever less(prenominal)en share of word clientele and political unrest at home, marked by the demands for social justice exerted by the stack union movement and the Labour political party (Weir, 1992 33 Kelly, 2011 190). In addition, th e expansion of the American naval forces as well as the efforts of the German Naval Office to extend the countrys sea power contributed to the diminished capacity of the Royal naval forces to project its capabilities in the wider world. In spite of these developments, it is safe to argue that the unify Kingdom had the greatest naval power upon immersionway World War One (Grey, 1925 23). Furthermore, the country ensured the continuation of its relative superiority in the sea by entryway into an concretion with Russia and France, geared towards counter balancing the emerging central bloc constituted by Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy (Wilson, 1985 59).The entente Cordiale, write between Britain and France in 1904, came about as a result of the willingness of the German conglomerate to enlarge their commercial gravel to the wider world, oddly in Africa where both populations had substantial compound interests (Von Tirpitz, 1920 130 Clark, 2012 124). The founding and pre servation of a German colonial system was to be carried out by dint of the expansion of the nations naval capabilities (Lambert, 2002 25). The British external Office was sure of the grand geopolitical designs of the German Empire. Some of its most orotund members distinguished a distinct revisionist positioning on the part of Germany, which they likened to the hegemonic get under bingles skin of Frances Napoleon a century front (Grey, 1925 44). The preservation of naval superiority and the mental hospital of political alliances with like-minded nations were conducive to abandoning the form _or_ system of government of neutrality in European affairs and to engage in an act of balancing against Germany (Clark, 2012 144). The holy terror of a German revisionist drive was outlined by Eyre Crowe, an official at the Western Department of the British outside(prenominal) office, in his famous memorandum of 1907. Crowe punctuate the occupy to maintain naval success in order to preserve the license of the seas and international commerce,In placeortion as England champions the principle of the largest measure of widely distributed exemption of commerce, she undoubtedly strengthens her hold on the elicit friendship of other nations, at least to the extent of making them feel less apprehensive of naval control in the hands of a free trade England than they would in the face of a preponderant protectionist Power (Crowe, 1907).The British diplomatic establishment was aware of the dangers of a revisionist Germany for world peace. At the same time, there was an expressed preoccupancy with the possibility that the extension of German naval resources may result in a simplification of British sea power (McDermott in Kennedy (ed.), 1979 81). This is what transpires from a statement made to the House of Commons in 1911 by Sir Edward Grey, British impertinent Secretary,Germany is rightly grand of her strength. She is building a big fleet. for sure it i s natural and obvious that the growth of that fleet must raise apprehensions, or at least make other nations truly sensitive to apprehensions, lest the Power which is becoming strong should yield vulturine designs towards themselves. I do not believe in these aggressive designs. I do not privation to have it interpreted in that sense, but I think it must be realised that other nations will be apprehensive and sensitive, and on the lookout for any indications of aggression. All we or the other neighbours of Germany appetency is to live with her on equal footing (Grey, 1911).The geopolitical implications of the nip and tuck of Germany were tied to the establishment of a naval network opened of sustaining the growing commercial influence of the nation in the wider world. However, it should be mentioned that in 1912 the German prime minister, Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, approached the British authorities in order to put an end to the naval race between the two countries (Ken nedy, 1983 120). The Chancellors approach might have been motivate by the need to cut by means of the change magnitude isolation of Germany in the European political order. The British authorities responded by send Richard Haldane, the Secretary of State for War, to hash out the harm of the detente with Imperial Germany (Grey, 1925 33). However, this mission failed due to the German proposal to accept the naval mandate of the United Kingdom in tax return for capital of the United Kingdoms neutral military strength in the typesetters case of a general conflagration and the assurance that the Berlin would not be branded as the aggressor (McDermott in Kennedy (ed.), 1979 86).The visit of Lord Haldane to Berlin revealed some of the geopolitical concerns regarding the revisionist stance adopted by Germany (Kennedy, 1980 60). Winston Churchill, who had been a member of the Liberal Cabinet, argued that whilst for Germany the maintenance of naval capabilities was a luxury, for Brit ain it a was a necessity (Churchill, 1923 144). Here we realize an go about by a prominent British politician to downplay the importance of the winding of naval resources on the part of Germany (Kennedy, 1980 67). This was make in order to reinforce the apprehension that British naval superiority was a feature of the European and international political order that was not to be disputed (Kelly, 2011 173). As we will see in the next section, the geopolitical considerations pertaining to the possibility of German command in the upright constituted a significant doer in the British conclusion to enter into the First World War (Epkenhans, 2008 122). The impact of the British-German naval rivalry in capital of the United Kingdoms decision to enter into the First World WarIn regards to the outbreak of hostilities, it should be argued that the blazonry race that took place between the United Kingdom and the Germany drove both nations to enter into the war (McDermott in Kennedy ( ed.), 1979 99). Additionally, the inimical interests of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires in the Balkans made their participation in the war inevitable. France embarked upon the pursuit of war as a consequence of the invasion by the German forces and its alliance commitments to Russia (Kennedy, 1989 91). It could be posited that one of the most salient aspects of World War One is constituted by the British participation in the war in order to balance the revisionist drive of the German Empire. From this perspective, the British entry into the war may be regarded as an attempt to maintain an proportion of forces in the European political order. This balance of power was tilting towards Germany in a decisive manner, since the country adopted the decision to build up its naval resources that ill threatened British supremacy at sea (Clark, 2012 132).There is an established consensus on a segment of the scholarship that is centred on the idea that the United Kingdom had pay bac k increasingly wary about the object of the German imperial government to amplify its naval capabilities (Massie, 1991 20). The Reichsflotte Doctrine, propounded by Admiral Tirpitz, revolve around the notion that Germany was impelled to prop up its naval resources in order to be able to inflict trauma to the Royal Navy in case of a war (Kelly, 2002 1037). However, it should be mentioned that in 1912 the German Chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, approached the British authorities in order to put an end to the naval race between the two countries (Kennedy, 1983 120). The Chancellors approach might have been motivated by the need to overcome the increasing isolation of Germany in the European political order. The British authorities responded by sending Richard Haldane, the Secretary of State for War, to negotiate the terms of the detente with Imperial Germany (Grey, 1925 33). This would force the United Kingdom to enter into an alliance with Germany. However, it may be st ated that the position of the United Kingdom was one of the defiance, preferring the option of entering into the First World War in order to maintain the possibility that Germany may achieve geopolitical supremacy in the European continent and a broader projection of power into the wider world (Epkenhans, 2008 101).During the decade that preceded the advent of World War One, the United Kingdom made considerable preparations in order to cater for the eventuality of hostilities against Germany (Kennedy, 1980 109). In addition to the signing of diplomatic treaties with France and Russia, the United Kingdom also entered into an alliance with Japan, in order to devote their attention to the emerging geopolitical scenario in the European theatre (Modelski and Thompson, 1988 19). The quickening of the naval race that took place during the 1908-12 period left an indelible impression on the mindset of British foreign policy makers (Clark, 2012 141). The shift from a naval to an ground fo rces doctrine by Germany in 1812 did not assuage tensions between the two countries, as it became another instrument to exert possible drop domination over the British affiliate France and Russia (Massie, 1991 50). Some alternative explanations to Britains entry into World War One keel around the idea that capital of the United Kingdom did not just seek to contain the naval prowess of Germany but to attain a situation in which the other competitors would see their sea power diminished (Kennedy, 1989 133). For example, the Russian Empire, which had experienced significant economic growth in the last two decades onward the war, could have potentially threatened British interests in India (Kennedy, 1980 11).The British Raj could not have been defended by its tiny armed forces in case of an overland Russian invasion. This prompted capital of the United Kingdom to seek an alliance with Russia, which was duly effectuated in 1907 (Steinberg, 1973 201 Kennedy, 1983 50). From this persp ective, confecting a German naval threat would be conducive to reassuring France and Russia that but the Royal Navy could provide an equilibrium of forces in the seas (Massie, 1991 56). Therefore, the British-German rivalry also has to be assessed in the context of British diminution of power due to the rise of revisionist powers much(prenominal) as Japan and Germany (Kelly, 2002 1036). In addition, the rise of the United States as the largest economy in the world also played into the geopolitical considerations of British foreign policy makers on the eve of World War One (Modelski and Thompson, 1988 21).The antagonism regarding the naval race between the United Kingdom and Germany has to be appraised in the context of the actual erosion of British power (McDermott in Kennedy (ed.), 1979 93). Consequently, British policy revolved around the principle of reduceing the rise of a naval competitor that could threaten its imperial possessions, rather than a revisionist power that coul d attain supremacy in the continent (Epkenhans, 2008 55). It could be stated that the strategy that led to British entry into World War One was centred around the maintenance of naval supremacy through the introduction of ships that would be able to rise to the challenge of an try against any of Britains imperial possessions (Kennedy, 1989 139). It was cognise at the time that Germany did not spoil an immediate threat to British Empire. However, the United Kingdom was compelled to enter into World War One in order to prevent a situation in which a victorious Germany would be in a position to reconfigure the geopolitical map through the accumulation of naval forces with France and Russia (Steinberg, 1973 199 Neilson, 1995 55). German supremacy in the European continent would have eventually resulted in naval self-confidence by an entente between Germany and the vanquished powers (Kennedy, 1983 88). The British-German naval rivalry was a significant factor in Britains entry into World War One due to the potential ramifications of a German victory in the continent, rather than as a retort to its potential supremacy over the European continent (Kelly, 2002 1034). ConclusionBy way of conclusion, it should be noted that the naval rivalry between the United Kingdom and Germany exerted a significant amount of influence in the decision to enter into the First World War. Prompted by Berlins accumulation of naval resources, the United Kingdom attempted to preserve its relative superiority in the sea by forging an alliance with Russia and France (Clark, 2012 one hundred fifty-five Steinberg, 1985 59). This was geared towards counterpoising the looming threat constituted by the associative framework between Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy. The Entente Cordiale originated from the need to counterbalance the German Empires to commercial and military reach into the wider world, especially in regions where both France and the United Kingdom had substantial colonial i nterests (Churchill, 1923 213).The British political establishment was well aware of the geopolitical constructs of the German Empire, which was compared to the hegemonic drive instigated by Napoleon in the early part of the nineteenth century (Steinberg, 1973 196 Kennedy, 1989 129). It may be argued that the motivations that led to British entry into the First World War were centred around the need to preserve naval supremacy through the retrofitting of the Royal Navys capabilities in order to fend off the challenge of an attack against any of Britains imperial possessions (Epkenhans, 2008 81). For all the reasons to be cited above, it could be cerebrate that the United Kingdom entered into the First World War in order to avoid a situation in which German supremacy in the European continent would result in an eventual naval alliance between Germany and its former enemies (Neilson, 1995 61). Consequently, the British-German naval rivalry was an important factor in Londons decision to enter into World War One, as the potential geopolitical implications of a German victory would have involved an eventual threat to British possessions overseas. These were to be defended at all costs. Even at the expense of entering into a war that diminished the stand of the United Kingdom in world affairs and which did not manage to port out the position of Germany in the European political spectrum.BibliographyChurchill, W. (1923) The World Crisis, 1911-1914, T London Thornton Butterworth LimitedClark, C. 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